Stable Matchings for A Generalized Marriage Problem
Somdeb Lahiri (lahirissebs.wits.ac.za)
Abstract: We show that a simple genralization of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with men proposing due to Gale and Shapley(1962), yeilds outcomes for a generalized marriage problem, which are necessarily stable. We also show, that any outcome of this prcedure is Weakly Pareto Optimal for Men, i.e., there is no other outcome which all men prefer to an outcome of this procedure. In a final concluding section of this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of contracts to choose from. We call such problems, generalized contract choice problems. The model we propose is a generalization of the model due to Shapley and Scarf (1974) called the housing market. We are able to show with the help of a three agent example, that there exists a generalized contract choice problem, which does not admit any stable outcome.
Keywords: stable outcome, marriage problem, contract choice, core, matching
Category 1: Other Topics (Game Theory )
Category 2: Applications -- OR and Management Sciences (Finance and Economics )
Citation: University of Witwatersrand at Johannesburg, October 2003.
Entry Submitted: 10/15/2003
Modify/Update this entry
|Visitors||Authors||More about us||Links|
Search, Browse the Repository
Give us feedback
|Optimization Journals, Sites, Societies|