Optimization Online


Stable Matchings for A Generalized Marriage Problem

Somdeb Lahiri (lahiris***at***sebs.wits.ac.za)

Abstract: We show that a simple genralization of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with men proposing due to Gale and Shapley(1962), yeilds outcomes for a generalized marriage problem, which are necessarily stable. We also show, that any outcome of this prcedure is Weakly Pareto Optimal for Men, i.e., there is no other outcome which all men prefer to an outcome of this procedure. In a final concluding section of this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of contracts to choose from. We call such problems, generalized contract choice problems. The model we propose is a generalization of the model due to Shapley and Scarf (1974) called the housing market. We are able to show with the help of a three agent example, that there exists a generalized contract choice problem, which does not admit any stable outcome.

Keywords: stable outcome, marriage problem, contract choice, core, matching

Category 1: Other Topics (Game Theory )

Category 2: Applications -- OR and Management Sciences (Finance and Economics )

Citation: University of Witwatersrand at Johannesburg, October 2003.

Download: [PDF]

Entry Submitted: 10/15/2003
Entry Accepted: 10/15/2003
Entry Last Modified: 05/03/2004

Modify/Update this entry

  Visitors Authors More about us Links
  Subscribe, Unsubscribe
Digest Archive
Search, Browse the Repository


Coordinator's Board
Classification Scheme
Give us feedback
Optimization Journals, Sites, Societies
Mathematical Programming Society