The carbon leakage effect on the cement sector under different climate policies
Abstract: The European emissions trading scheme (EU-ETS) is a cap and trade system that requires the indus- tries participating in the program to obtain allowances to cover their carbon emissions. Energy Intensive Industries claim that this system puts their European plants at an economics disadvantage compared to fa- cilities located outside the EU. As a direct consequence, industries may relocate their production activities in unregulated countries, leading to the so-called carbon leakage effect. In order to curb this effect, several policies have been devised, including grandfathering of CO2 allowances and border tax adjustment. This paper investigates the impact of these two policies on the cement sector, with a particular focus on the Italian market, particularly prone to carbon leakage. The analysis is based on an oligopolistic partial equilibrium model with a detailed technological representation of the market. The model is a Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem that accounts for the interactions of cement companies. Simulations show that neither the grandfathering nor the border tax adjustment fully solve the carbon leakage problem because cement companies modify their cement and clinker trade strategies according to the measure applied in order to avoid or reduce their carbon costs.
Keywords: Carbon leakage, Cement industry emissions, EU Emissions Trading Scheme, Environmental policies, Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem.
Category 1: Applications -- OR and Management Sciences
Entry Submitted: 02/08/2015
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