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On the Price of Satisficing in Network User Equilibria

Mahdi Takalloo (mtakalloo***at***mail.usf.edu)
Changhyun Kwon (chkwon***at***usf.edu)

Abstract: When drivers are satisficing decision-makers, the resulting traffic pattern attains a satisficing user equilibrium, which may deviate from the (perfectly rational) user equilibrium. In a satisficing user equilibrium traffic pattern, the total system travel time can be worse than in the case of the PRUE. We show how bad the worst-case satisficing user equilibrium traffic pattern can be, compared to the perfectly rational user equilibrium. We call the ratio between the total system travel times of the two traffic patterns the price of satisficing, for which we provide an analytical bound. Using the sensitivity analysis for variational inequalities, we propose a numerical method to quantify the price of satisficing for any given network instance.

Keywords: bounded rationality; satisficing; user equilibrium; sensitivity analysis

Category 1: Other Topics (Game Theory )

Category 2: Network Optimization

Category 3: Applications -- OR and Management Sciences (Transportation )

Citation: Working Paper, University of South Florida, 2017

Download: [PDF]

Entry Submitted: 06/12/2017
Entry Accepted: 06/12/2017
Entry Last Modified: 06/25/2017

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