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Assessment of Climate Agreements over the Long Term with Strategic Carbon Dioxyde Removal Activity

Frederic Babonneau(frederic.babonneau***at***uai.cl)
Alain Haurie(ahaurie***at***gmail.com)
Alain Vielle (marc.vielle***at***epfl.ch )

Abstract: In this paper we extend a game theoretic meta-model used to assess the future of Paris agreement to the time horizon 2100 and we include in the strategic decisions of the negotiating coalitions the use of Carbon Dioxyde Removal (CDR) technologies. The meta-game model is calibrated through statistical emulation of GEMINI-E3, a world computable general equilibrium model. It permits the identification of a fair sharing of the safety cumulative emissions budget, compatible with a 2oC warming. In this scenario CDR technologies play an important strategic role in the second half of the century and leave some room for fossil fuels in the primary energy balance.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium, Climate negotiations, meta-Game, carbon dioxide removal, negative emissions

Category 1: Other Topics (Game Theory )

Category 2: Applications -- OR and Management Sciences (Other )

Citation: Technical report

Download: [PDF]

Entry Submitted: 06/07/2019
Entry Accepted: 06/07/2019
Entry Last Modified: 06/07/2019

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